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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The magistrate court denied Kari Janae Phipps’ (hereinafter, Ms. Phipps) motion to
suppress her detention during a probation residence check for a friend she was visiting. On
intermediate appeal to the district court, the magistrate’s denial was reversed. The district court
found the automatic detention of a visitor present during a parole search is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. The State now appeals, claiming for the first time that Ms. Phipps was not a
visitor.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Phipps was present during a search of a parolee’s apartment pursuant to the parolee’s
consent via a condition of parole subjecting his residence to verification and search at any time.
(Tr., p. 9, Ls. 8 – 14; p. 27, Ls. 11 – 19). In the course of the search, Ms. Phipps, who is neither a
resident of the parolee’s apartment nor a probationer or parolee herself, was ordered to sit in the
living room. (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 1 – 4; p. 63, 6 – 8).1 During the search, Ms. Phipps was detained and
questioned regarding whether she had anything in her backpack a K9 would detect. (Tr., p. 31, L.
23 – p. 32, L. 7). It is stipulated that Ms. Phipps was not free to leave the premises. (Tr., p. 37, Ls.
2 – 8). Further, the magistrate court recognized that, in Ms. Phipps’s case, there was no belief of
criminal wrongdoing of any kind. (Tr., p. 63, Ls. 8 – 10). Thus, the record reflects that Ms. Phipps
was detained, and that this detention was not based on reasonable suspicion.
Rather, the justification for the probation and parole officers’ detention of Ms. Phipps was
twofold: investigatory - not wanting individuals to leave in the event other drugs or felony warrants
were found - and officer safety, preventing individuals on the premises during a residence check

The magistrate court found Ms. Phipps was “simply a person merely present” and not a
resident. (Tr., p. 63, Ls. 6 – 8).
1
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from departing in case they intended to come back and harm officers. (Tr., p. 12, L. 18 – p. 13, L.
11). Based on Ms. Phipps’s statements during that detention, she was further held pending arrival
of Coeur d’Alene Police. (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 4 – 18). After police arrived, Ms. Phipps was read her
Miranda rights and her backpack was searched. (Tr., p. 48, L. 6 – p. 49, L. 3). Ms. Phipps was
cited for possession of paraphernalia. (Tr., p. 51, Ls. 15 – 18).
The magistrate found the State’s officer safety argument persuasive, essentially holding
that officer authority to detain persons pursuant to a search warrant likewise applies to probation
searches of homes denying the motion to suppress. (Tr., p. 63, L. 18 – p. 64, L. 5). In so holding,
the magistrate relied on United States Supreme Court precedent and Federal precedent from the
Ninth Circuit. (Tr., p. 63, Ls. 20 – 23; p. 64, 6 –12). Ms. Phipps timely filed a notice of appeal to
challenge the magistrate’s denial of her Motion to Suppress Evidence. (R., pp. 28 – 29).
The district court, in its appellate capacity, reversed the magistrate court. (R., pp. 71 – 82).
The district court found that Ms. Phipps was not a resident, but simply present, during the search
of the parolee’s home. (R., p. 72). It further found that although there are justifications for the
detention of individuals present during the execution of a search warrant, the same justifications
are not present during a routine probation and parole search. The probation officers observed Ms.
Phipps upon entering the residence and did not observe she was armed. (R., p. 89). In addition
there was no suspicion that Ms. Phipps was involved in criminal activity or posed a safety risk.
Id. Because Ms. Phipps was not a resident, the district court found she could not aid in the efficacy
of the search because she had no access to open safes or other locked containers. (R., p. 81).
Therefore the court concluded that Ms. Phipps was unlawfully seized and reversed the magistrate.
Id.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the State may now argue for the first time on appeal that Ms. Phipps was a
resident.
2. Whether law enforcement may detain an individual found on the premises of a residence
subject to searches pursuant to a condition of probation or parole.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court did not Err in Reversing the Magistrate Court’s Denial of the
Motion to Suppress.
A. Introduction.
The State argues the district court erred by reversing the magistrate court’s order denying

Ms. Phipps Motion to Suppress. For the first time on appeal the State argues that Ms. Phipps was
a resident of the home subject to routine searches by probation and parole officers. The State also
contends that an individual’s detention during a parole search is a reasonable intrusion justified by
the government’s interest in preventing flight, officer safety, and orderly completion of the search.
The State’s arguments fail. First, the state previously conceded that Ms. Phipps was not a
resident and cannot now bring forth a new theory of the case. It must rely on the theory brought
before the Magistrate and District Courts. In addition, a search warrant based on probable cause
objectively justifies the detention of an individual where a magistrate has determined suspected
criminal activity. This same determination is not found during a routine search of a parolee’s home
during a search pursuant to the standard conditions of parole. The district court addressed each
factor set forth in Summers and the inherent difference between the execution of a probable cause
search warrant and a search pursuant to consent as a condition or probation or parole.
It found that the detention of an individual based on risk of flight is not justified absent
suspicion incriminating evidence will be found or a belief that the individual may in fact flee. The
concern for officer safety does not dictate a detention where the officers were familiar with Ms.
Phipps, there was no suspicion of criminal activity of any kind, and there was no perceived safety
risk posed by Ms. Phipps. Finally, allowing a non-resident to leave, absent suspicion of criminal
activity or a safety risk, will not interfere with an orderly search of a parolee’s residence.
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B. Standard of Review.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Willoughby, 147
Idaho 482, 485, 211 P.3d 91, 94 (2009). When a decision of the district court acting in its appellate
capacity on a motion to suppress is challenged, the court accepts the magistrate court’s findings of
fact that are supported by substantial evidence unless clearly erroneous. Id. However, this Court
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. Id. at 486.
C. The State previously conceded that Ms. Phipps was not a resident.
The State now argues, for the first time on appeal to this Court, that Ms. Phipps was a
resident of the apartment searched in this matter. (Appellant’s Brief p. 6; 7; 9). This Court reviews
the factual findings of the magistrate court to determine whether they are supported by substantial
and competent evidence. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 414–15, 224 P.3d 480, 481–82 (2009).
“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Lutton, 161 Idaho
556, 560, 388 P.3d 71, 75 (Ct. App. 2017) (citing State v. Valdez–Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897
P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999)).
The issue of whether Ms. Phipps was a resident is one of fact that is now disputed by the
State. The magistrate court found that Ms. Phipps was “simply a person merely present” during a
status search of the parolee’s home after hearing testimony from two parole officers. (Tr., p. 63,
Ls. 6 – 7). The district court properly addressed and disposed of this issue in its Memorandum
Decision and Order on Appeal by finding the State acknowledges Ms. Phipps was a visitor to the
residence. (R. 72; 89). The magistrate’s record also supports this factual finding. Specifically,
the State previously conceded that Ms. Phipps is a visitor and not a resident. (R. 57; Aug. p. 4).
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The magistrate does not refer to Ms. Phipps as a resident but instead as an individual. (Tr., p. 55,
Ls. 1 – 4).
The Idaho Supreme Court will not allow an issue to be raised that was not first presented
in the trial court. State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017). In
Garcia-Rodriguez, the State appealed the district court’s order granting the motion to suppress.
Id. at 237. The State had argued in district court that Garcia-Rodriguez was lawfully arrested under
I.C. § 49-1407. On appeal the State advance a brand new argument where I.C. § 49-1407 was
immaterial and probable cause existed under I.C. § 49-301(1) and Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S.
164, 171–72, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008). Id. at 274 – 275. However, this
Court found that the argument was not properly advanced in the lower court and therefore could
not be an issue on review. Id. at 276.
The State will be held to the theory presented to the lower court and additional issues not
previously raised will not be considered. Id. The Court went on to reiterate that “‘[a]ppellate court
review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.’” Id. at 275
(quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007)).
The State now advances a new argument and theory aimed at the reasonableness of
detaining a resident of a home subject to the random or routine searches of parole officers. This
position is inconsistent with the magistrate’s factual findings at the suppression hearing and was
also conceded by the State during argument. This argument is also inconsistent with the factual
findings of the district court. The theory that a resident’s detention would be reasonable has never
appeared before in the lower courts and the State has made no attempt to explain why now it should
be allowed. Therefore, this Court must also find Ms. Phipps was a visitor and not a resident.
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D. The District Court Correctly Applied Michigan v. Summers to Determine the Seizure
of Ms. Phipps was Unreasonable.
The district court correctly found Ms. Phipps’s was unlawfully seized when law
enforcement arrived to perform a residence check of a parolee. Article I, § 17 of the Constitution
of the State of Idaho and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons or property. State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho
641, 644, 181 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008). Both warrantless seizures and warrantless
intrusions into a home by government agents are presumptively unreasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 98,
57 P.3d 807, 809 (Ct. App. 2002). This presumption may be overcome by the State demonstrating
one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirements apply. Stewart, 145 Idaho at
641; State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct. App. 1996).
If an exception to the warrant requirement does not apply, evidence obtained during the
unconstitutional search or seizure is considered “fruit of the poisonous tree”, and the government
carries the burden of proof to show that the unlawful police conduct did not taint the evidence.
State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 537, 5 P.3d 993, 998 (Ct.App.2000). If the causal connection
between the unlawful conduct and evidence seized has not been broken by “means sufficiently
distinguishable to purge the primary taint”, the evidence is not admissible and must be suppressed
in a criminal prosecution of the person whose rights were violated. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 910,
155 P.3d 704, 711 (Ct. App. 2006); Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 98.
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1. Ms. Phipps was seized in the absence of a warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement.
Seizures, which occur whenever a police officer “accosts an individual and restrains [her]
freedom to walk away…” are presumptively unreasonable when conducted without a warrant.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. The restraint on the individual’s liberty can be effectuated by means of
physical force or show of authority. Stewart, 145 Idaho at 644. The inquiry is whether, considering
all surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would think that she was not free to leave or
not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about her business. United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho
474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).
Not all seizures are unreasonable; even where there is a seizure, it may be sustained without
affront to the Fourth Amendment when it is appropriately justified. Martinez, 129 Idaho at 429.
An investigative detention of limited duration, commonly known as a Terry stop, falls under a
judicially created exception to the probable cause requirement; it need only be supported by a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 479. Suspicion is reasonable if
the officer’s awareness of specific, articulable facts and his rational inferences therefrom justify a
suspicion that the individual at issue has committed or is about to commit a crime. Martinez, 129
Idaho at 430. The reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of
the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12, 878 P.2d 184, 186
(Ct. App. 1994) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 16 P.3d 931 (2000).
The courts below found the officers conceded that reasonable suspicion did not exist. (Tr.,
p. 15, L. 22 – p. 16, L. 7; p. 24, Ls. 10 – 19; p. 38, Ls. 4 – 15; p. 63, Ls. 8 – 9). Ms. Phipps does
not question these factual findings nor does the State. Without reasonable suspicion, Ms. Phipps’s
detention cannot be sustained under Terry.
8

2. Officers were not executing a search warrant and therefore cannot detain visitors
during a routine probation and parole search.
When executing a search warrant for drugs or contraband founded on probable cause,
police have the limited authority to detain individuals who are occupants of a premises while a
proper search is conducted. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595, 69
L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981). The Summers court reasoned that, because a detached and neutral magistrate
had determined that police had probable cause that someone in the home was committing a crime,
the occupant’s connection to that home provided officers with “an easily identifiable and certain
basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant.” Id.
at 704. Additionally, the court looked to other relevant factors, including preventing flight in the
event incriminating evidence was found, minimizing the risk of harm to officers, and the orderly
completion of the search of a residence as facilitated by occupants. Id. at 702.
Later, in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299 (2005), the
court held that detention of occupants may even include reasonable force where appropriate. The
Muehler court found that the occupant’s detention in handcuffs for the length of the search was
consistent with Summers’ holding that officers executing a search warrant have the authority “to
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Id. (quoting Summers,
452 U.S. at 705). Specifically, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause a warrant existed to search the
premises and Mena was an occupant of the premises at the time of the search”, her detention was
reasonable under Summers. Id. See also Id. at 125 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reiterating that
Summers authorizes the detention of any individual who is present when a valid search warrant is
being executed).
Finally, in Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009) overruled on other grounds
by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012), the court held that detention of the
9

occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance search was not a violation of the
occupants’ clearly established constitutional rights. In that case, a probationer’s parents,
grandmother (who was suffering from cancer), sister, and four-year-old nephew were detained
pursuant to a compliance search. Id., 574 F.3d at 1171. The Sanchez court determined that the
three justifications underlying the Muehler decision – preventing the flight of criminals, ensuring
officer safety, and facilitating orderly completion of valid searches – were present in every valid
home search. Sanchez, 574 F.3d at 1174. Further, the court found that the evidence sufficient to
persuade a judicial officer to issue a warrant was akin to parole and probation conditions justifying
a home search, holding that both are categorically sufficient to justify the requisite invasion of
privacy. Id. Finally, the court reasoned that a search warrant is not the only basis for heightened
suspicion that a home’s occupants might be involved in criminal activity: “‘parolees ... are more
likely [than ordinary citizens] to commit future criminal offenses.’” Id. (quoting
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 844, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2195, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006) (quoting
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d
344 (1998)).
Where a valid warrant is present, Idaho case law is analogous: in the execution of a search
warrant at a residence, police have the right to detain, during the duration of the search, those
individuals who are occupants of the residence. State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643, 646, 51 P.3d 457,
460 (Ct. App. 2002). The articulable and individualized suspicion to justify this seizure is found
in the issuance of a search warrant by a judicial officer based upon probable cause, which
establishes a nexus between the individual and the criminal activity giving rise to the warrant. Id.
On the other hand, individuals found on the premises at the inception of the search whose identity
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and connection to the premises are unknown may be detained only as long as necessary to
determine those facts and to protect the safety of those present during the detention. Id.
See also State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643, 51 P.3d 457 (Ct. App. 2002) (where unknown
individual arrived at premises being searched pursuant to a warrant, the individual was wearing a
fanny pack, the individual gave a questionable explanation for being at the premises so late at
night, and the officer was aware that some individuals were coming to the premises to trade
weapons for drugs, detention of individual to determine his identity and relationship to the house
was appropriate). See also State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 701 P.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1985) (while
police could ask individual arriving at premises during probation search who he was and where he
lived, they were not entitled to detain him until the point that reasonable suspicion was aroused
due to his responses lacking “the ring of truth”); State v. Bulgin, 120 Idaho 878, 820 P.2d 1235
(Ct. App. 1991) (during probation search, probationers and overnight guest described by
confidential informant as user and dealer of methamphetamine were detained, but other guest was
allowed to leave).
Idaho has specifically recognized that the Court has not extended the authority to detain
individuals on a premises being searched pursuant to a warrant to include searches based on
probation conditions. State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 916, 155 P.3d 712, 717 (Ct. App. 2007).
While there is an absence of Idaho case law directly on point, the district court properly
found that a warrant based on probable cause establishes a nexus between the premises described
in the warrant and its occupants, such nexus is not present where a search is based on consent via
waiver as a condition of parole or probation.
In this instance, officers were aware that Ms. Phipps was a visitor, not a resident. (Tr., p.
19, Ls., 22 – 23). Thus, the justifications underlying the detention in Muehler are hardly persuasive

11

here. Where Ms. Phipps does not live at the parolee’s residence, it is doubtful that she is going to
be in flight due to incriminating evidence uncovered on the premises because it is not a natural
place for her to store things.
a.

Preventing Flight.

The district court addressed the interest of preventing flight in the event that incriminating
evidence is found. (R., p. 78). It reasoned a search warrant based on probable cause increases the
risk that individuals present may attempt flight due to the belief that incriminating evidence is
present. Id. This will necessarily increase the risk of officer safety. Id. The district court went
on to find that when an individual present at a parolee’s residence is, based on reasonable
suspicion, actually involved in criminal activity or presents a safety risk, that individual may be
detained for further investigation. Id. However, the district court found that in this case the officers
did not suspect criminal activity or that Ms. Phipps presented a safety risk to themselves. Id.
Rather the district court found that, Ms. Phipps was detained immediately seized when the
officers entered the parolee’s apartment and ordered to sit in the living room. Id. at 79. The
officers conceded that Ms. Phipps was not suspected of any law violation or suspected her of about
to commit a law violation. Id.; (Tr., p. 38, Ls. 9 – 15). The search was simply based on a residence
check for the parolee. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 13 – 14). She was not armed or dangerous based on the
officers observations. Id.; (Tr., p. 34, L. 16 – p. 35, L. 7). The officers did not possess any
information that Ms. Phipps or anyone else at the residence was involved in criminal activity or
that Ms. Phipps posed a safety risk. Id. The search of the parolee’s residence was simply a
residence check without suspicion of any criminal activity. (Tr., p. 63, Ls. 8 – 10). In accepting
the terms of parole, the individual residing at the premises at issue here agreed to a condition
allowing parole officers to check his residence at any time. Consequently, the district court
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correctly concluded that it was not criminal activity or suspicion that gave rise to the search, but
consent.
b.

Minimizing the Risk of Harm to Officers.

Next, the district court addressed the concern for “minimizing the risk of harm to the
officer.” (R., p. 79). In Summers, the Court found that there is an inherent risk of sudden violence
or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence during a warrant search for narcotics. Summers,
452 U.S. at 702.
However, the search conducted here was based on a routine parole residence check. The
same risks often associated with a search warrant for narcotics are not present here because there
is “no underlying probable cause that evidence of criminal activity will actually be discovered.”
(R., p. 80). The same officer safety concerns in Summers do not extend to the parole search in this
case where Ms. Phipps was simply a visitor, there was no suspicion of criminal activity, and there
was no perceived safety risk.
c.

Efficacy of the Search.

The district court then looked to the final factor of facilitating an orderly completion of the
search while avoiding the use of force. Summers and Sanchez were both addressed by the court
and it found that in those cases the individuals detained were residents of the premises to be
searched. Id. It is reasonable to think that a resident would have access to certain locked doors
and containers within the home. However, it is unreasonable to presume a mere visitor to a home
would have the same access as a resident.
Ms. Phipps was not a resident and therefore her ability to assist the officers in opening
safes or other locked containers would unbelievable. The State has provided no explanation for
this factor because Ms. Phipps would not be able to assist the officers where she is not a resident.
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Therefore, the detention of a visitor is not justified in order to facilitate the orderly completion of
a search.
d.

Detention during Probation and Parole Search is more Intrusive than the Search

Itself.
The States argues Summers supports the detention here because it is less intrusive than the
search itself, is not likely to be exploited, and bears neither the inconvenience not the indignity
associated with a compelled visit to the police station. (Appellant’s brief p. 8). However, this
argument must fail. The Court in Summers reasoned that a resident subject to a search warrant
would naturally remain, unless there was an intent to flee to avoid arrest, in order observe the
search of their own possessions. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701. In addition, the detention would not
likely be exploited to gain information because the information sought is normally obtained
through the search and not through the detention.2 Id.
Here, Ms. Phipps did not reside at the parolee’s residence and therefore would not
reasonably be expected to stay and observe her personal belongings being searched. There is no
logical reason for her to remain in the residence to oversee the search of items that did not belong
to her. The continued detention of Ms. Phipps amount to a significant intrusion on her freedom to
leave and go about her business. Not being a resident of the home gives her no interest in staying
through the completion of a search. Furthermore, the parole officers were not diligently pursuing
an investigation but instead were administering a routine check. The routine check necessarily
results in a search but here the search was not based on suspicion of criminal activity by the parolee
In a footnote the Court stated “Professor LaFave has noted that the reasonableness of a
detention may be determined in part by ‘whether the police are diligently pursuing a means of
investigation which is likely to resolve the matter one way or another very soon....’” Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 n.2, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2594 n.2, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981) (citing 3 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, p. 40 (1978)).
2
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of any kind. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the officers to further detain Ms. Phipps based on
here mere presence at the time of the search.
The State next relies on State v. Reynolds for the proposition that independent reasonable
suspicion is not required for the detention of individuals during the execution of a search warrant.
Herein lies the fundamental difference between a search warrant and parole search. There the
court found “When police detain individuals in the execution of a search warrant, the articulable
and individualized suspicion to support the detention is found in the issuance of a search warrant
by a judicial officer based upon probable cause.” Reynolds, 143 Idaho at 915 (citing Kester, 137
Idaho at 646). There is no such independent finding in the execution of a probation or parole
search. The parolee has already consented to a search of his home and personal belongings by
parole officers regardless of an independent finding of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
This consent is established as a condition of being on parolee no prerequisite finding from a
magistrate judge is required in order for this type of search to happen.
CONCLUSION
Allowing the automatic detention of visitors during a routine probation and parole search
is fundamentally wrong. The type of search involved here has none of the hallmarks of search
warrant and would make anyone subject to seizure. Absolutely no prerequisite in the form of
probable cause is required to conduct the search or detention when officers arrive. The effects of
a ruling in the State’s favor would allow law enforcement to treat guests of a probationers and
parolees like they themselves have done wrong just by being present. Furthermore, it would
enflame the scarlet letter already worn by probationer and parolees. Who would want to help,
mentor, befriend, or even associate with a probationer or parolee knowing he or she would be
subject to detention on the whim of that person’s probation officer?
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Therefore, the district court did not erred in its determination that Ms. Phipps was
unlawfully seized when law enforcement arrived to perform a residence check. For the foregoing
reasons, Ms. Phipps respectfully requests that this Court affirm the order of the district court
reversing the denial her Motion to Suppress.
DATED this 5th day of February, 2019.
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